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3. A deprivation of liberty is not confined to the classic case of detention following arrest or conviction, but may take numerous other forms (Guzzardi v. Italy, § 95) .
2) Criteria to be applied
4. The Court does not consider itself bound by the legal conclusions of the domestic authorities as to whether or not there has been a deprivation of liberty, and undertakes an autonomous assessment of the situation (H.L. v. the United Kingdom, § 90; H.M. v. Switzerland, § § 30 and 48; Creangă v. Romania [GC] , § 92).
5. In order to determine whether someone has been "deprived of his liberty" within the meaning of Article 5, the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question (Guzzardi v. Italy, § 92; Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC] , § 73; Creangă v. Romania [GC] , § 91).
6. The requirement to take account of the "type" and "manner of implementation" of the measure in question enables the Court to have regard to the specific context and circumstances surrounding types of restriction other than the paradigm of confinement in a cell. Indeed, the context in which the measure is taken is an important factor, since situations commonly occur in modern society where the public may be called on to endure restrictions on freedom of movement or liberty in the interests of the common good (Nada v. Switzerland [GC] , § 226; Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC] , § 59).
7. The notion of deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 contains both an objective element of a person's confinement in a particular restricted space for a not negligible length of time, and an additional subjective element in that the person has not validly consented to the confinement in question (Storck v. Germany, § 74; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC] , § 117).
* The hyperlinks to the cases cited in the electronic version of the Guide refer to the original text in English or French (the two official languages of the Court) of the judgment or decision delivered by the Court and to the decisions or reports of the European Commission of Human Rights. Unless otherwise indicated, all references are to a judgment on the merits delivered by a Chamber of the Court. The abbreviation "(dec.)" indicates that the citation is of a decision of the Court and " [GC] " that the case was heard by the Grand Chamber.
8. Relevant objective factors to be considered include the possibility to leave the restricted area, the degree of supervision and control over the person's movements, the extent of isolation and the availability of social contacts (see, for example, Guzzardi v. Italy, § 95; H.M. v. Switzerland, § 45; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, § 91; and Storck v. Germany, § 73) .
9. Where the facts indicate a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, the relatively short duration of the detention does not affect this conclusion (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, § 317; Iskandarov v. Russia, § 140) .
10. An element of coercion in the exercise of police powers of stop and search is indicative of a deprivation of liberty, notwithstanding the short duration of the measure (Krupko and Others v. Russia, § 36; Foka v. Turkey, § 78; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom, § 57; Shimovolos v. Russia, § 50; and Brega and Others v. Moldova, § 43) .
11. The fact that a person is not handcuffed, put in a cell or otherwise physically restrained does not constitute a decisive factor in establishing the existence of a deprivation of liberty (M.A. v. Cyprus, § 193) .
12. The right to liberty is too important in a democratic society for a person to lose the benefit of Convention protection for the single reason that he may have given himself up to be taken into detention, especially when that person is legally incapable of consenting to, or disagreeing with, the proposed action (H.L. v. the United Kingdom, § 90; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC] , § 119).
13. The fact that a person lacks legal capacity does not necessarily mean that he is unable to understand and consent to situation (ibid., § 130; Shtukaturov v. Russia, D.D. v. Lithuania, § 150) .
3) Measures adopted within a prison
14. Disciplinary steps imposed within a prison which have effects on conditions of detention cannot be considered as constituting deprivation of liberty. Such measures must be regarded in normal circumstances as modifications of the conditions of lawful detention and fall outside the scope of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (Bollan v. the United Kingdom (dec.)).
4) Security checks of air travellers
15. Where a passenger has been stopped by border officials during border control in an airport in order to clarify his situation and where this detention has not exceeded the time strictly necessary to comply with relevant formalities, no issue arises under Article 5 of the Convention (Gahramanov v. Azerbaijan (dec.), § 41).
5) Deprivation of liberty outside formal arrest and detention
16. The question of applicability of Article 5 has arisen in a variety of circumstances, including: -the placement of individuals in psychiatric or social care institutions (see, among many other authorities, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium; Nielsen v. Denmark; H.M. v. Switzerland; H.L. v. the United Kingdom; Storck v. Germany; A. and Others v. Bulgaria; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC] ); -confinement in airport transit zones (Amuur v. France; Shamsa v. Poland; Mogoş and Others v. Romania (dec.); Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.); and Riad and Idiab v. Belgium) ;
-questioning in a police station (I.I. v. Bulgaria; Osypenko v. Ukraine; Salayev v. Azerbaijan; Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan; and Creangă v. Romania [GC] ); -stops and searches by the police (Foka v. Turkey; Gillan and Quinton v. the United Kingdom; and Shimovolos v. Russia) ; -crowd control measures adopted by the police on public order grounds (Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC]); -house arrest (Mancini v. Italy; Lavents v. Latvia; Nikolova v. Bulgaria (no. 2); and Dacosta Silva v. Spain) .
6) Positive obligations with respect to deprivation of liberty
17. Article 5 § 1, first sentence, lays down a positive obligation on the State not only to refrain from active infringement of the rights in question, but also to take appropriate steps to provide protection against an unlawful interference with those rights to everyone within its jurisdiction (El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC] , § 239).
18. The State is therefore obliged to take measures providing effective protection of vulnerable persons, including reasonable steps to prevent a deprivation of liberty of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge (Storck v. Germany, § 102) .
19. The responsibility of a State is engaged if it acquiesces in a person's loss of liberty by private individuals or fails to put an end to the situation (Riera Blume and Others v. Spain; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, Medova v. Russia, .
II. LAWFULNESS OF THE DETENTION UNDER ARTICLE 5 § 1

1) Purpose of Article 5
20. The key purpose of Article 5 is to prevent arbitrary or unjustified deprivations of liberty (McKay v. theUnited Kingdom [GC] , § 30). The right to liberty and security is of the highest importance in a "democratic society" within the meaning of the Convention (Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], § 76; Ladent v. Poland, § 45, 18 March 2008) .
21. The Court therefore considers that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention and discloses a most grave violation of that provision (El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC] , § 233). The absence of a record of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person effecting it must be seen as incompatible, inter alia, with the very purpose of Article 5 of the Convention (Kurt v. Turkey, § 125) . It is also incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness under the Convention (Anguelova v. Bulgaria, § 154) .
2) Compliance with national law
22. In order to meet the requirement of lawfulness, detention must be "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law". This means that detention must conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law (Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC] , § 125) or international law where appropriate (see, among many other authorities, Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], § 79; Toniolo v. San Marino and Italy, § 46) . 23. For example, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 5 where the authorities had failed to lodge an application for extension of a detention order within the time-limit prescribed by law (G. K. v. Poland, § 76) . By contrast, an alleged breach of a circular concerning the manner in which inquiries had to be conducted into certain types of offences did not invalidate the domestic legal basis for arrest and subsequent detention (Talat Tepe v. Turkey, § 62) .
3) Review of compliance with national law
24. While it is normally in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, the position is different in relation to cases where failure to comply with such law entails a breach of the Convention. In cases where Article 5 § 1 of the Convention is at stake, the Court must exercise a certain power to review whether national law has been observed (see, among many other authorities, Creangă v. Romania [GC] , § 101; Baranowski v. Poland, § 50; Benham v. the United Kingdom, § 41) . In doing so, the Court must have regard to the legal situation as it stood at the material time (Włoch v. Poland, § 114) .
4) General principles
25. The requirement of lawfulness is not satisfied merely by compliance with the relevant domestic law; domestic law must itself be in conformity with the Convention, including the general principles expressed or implied in it (Plesó v. Hungary, § 59) .
The general principles implied by the Convention to which the Article 5 § 1 case-law refers are the principle of the rule of law and, connected to the latter, that of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality and the principle of protection against arbitrariness which is, moreover, the very aim of Article 5 (Simons v. Belgium (dec.), § 32).
5) The principle of legal certainty
26. Where deprivation of liberty is concerned it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of "lawfulness" set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person -if need be, with appropriate advice -to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see, among recent authorities, Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], § 125; Creangă v. Romania, § 120; and Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC] , § 80).
27. For example, the practice of keeping a person in detention under a bill of indictment without any specific basis in the national legislation or case-law is in breach of Article 5 § 1 (Baranowski v. Poland, (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) . Likewise, the practice of automatically renewing pre-trial detention without any precise legislative foundation is contrary to Article 5 § 1 (Svipsta v. Latvia, § 86) . By contrast, the continued detention of a person on the basis of an order by the Indictment Chamber requiring further investigations, without issuing a formal detention order, did not disclose a violation of that Article (Laumont v. France, § 50) .
28. Provisions which are interpreted in an inconsistent and mutually exclusive manner by the domestic authorities will, too, fall short of the "quality of law" standard required under the Convention (Nasrulloyev v. Russia, § 77; Ječius v. Lithuania, (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) . However, in the absence of any case-law, the Court is not called upon to give its own interpretation of national law. Therefore, it may be reluctant to conclude that the national courts have failed to act in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law (Włoch v. Poland, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, (48) (49) (50) .
29. Although diplomatic notes are a source of international law, detention of crew on the basis of such notes is not lawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention insofar as they are not sufficiently precise and foreseeable. In particular, the lack of specific reference to the potential arrest and detention of crew members will fall foul of the requirements of legal certainty and foreseeability under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC] , § § 96-100).
6) No arbitrariness
30. In addition, any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness (see, among many other authorities, Witold Litwa v. Poland, § 78) .
31. The notion of "arbitrariness" in Article 5 § 1 extends beyond lack of conformity with national law, so that a deprivation of liberty may be lawful in terms of domestic law but still arbitrary and thus contrary to the Convention (Creangă v. Romania, § 84; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC] , § 164).
32. The notion of arbitrariness varies to a certain extent depending on the type of detention involved. The Court has indicated that arbitrariness may arise where there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities; where the order to detain and the execution of the detention did not genuinely conform to the purpose of the restrictions permitted by the relevant sub-paragraph of Article 5 § 1; where there was no connection between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and conditions of detention; and where there was no relationship of proportionality between the ground of detention relied on and the detention in question (for a detailed overview of the key principles see James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom, and Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC] , § § 68-74).
33. The speed with which the domestic courts replace a detention order which has either expired or has been found to be defective is a further relevant element in assessing whether a person's detention must be considered arbitrary (Mooren v. Germany [GC] , § 80). Thus, the Court considers in the context of sub-paragraph (c) that a period of less than a month between the expiry of the initial detention order and the issuing of a fresh, reasoned detention order following a remittal of the case from the appeal court to a lower court did not render the applicant's detention arbitrary (Minjat v. Switzerland, § § 46 and 48) . In contrast, a period of more than a year following a remittal from a court of appeal to a court of lower instance, in which the applicant remained in a state of uncertainty as to the grounds for his detention on remand, combined with the lack of a time-limit for the lower court to re-examine his detention, was found to render the applicant's detention arbitrary (Khudoyorov v. Russia, .
7) Court order
34. A period of detention is, in principle, "lawful" if it is based on a court order. Detention on the basis of an order later found to be unlawful by a superior court may still be valid under domestic law (Bozano v. France, § 55) . Detention may remain in accordance with "a procedure prescribed by law" even though the domestic courts have admitted that there had been flaws in the detention proceedings but held the detention to be lawful nevertheless (Erkalo v. the Netherlands, (55) (56) . Thus, even flaws in the detention order do not necessarily render the underlying period of detention unlawful within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (Yefimenko v. Russia, Ječius v. Lithuania, § 68; Benham v. the United Kingdom, (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) .
35. The Court distinguishes between acts of domestic courts which are within their jurisdiction and those which are in excess of jurisdiction (ibid., § § 43 et seq.). Detention orders have been found to be ex facie invalid in cases where the interested party did not have proper notice of the hearing (Khudoyorov v. Russia, § 129) , the domestic courts had failed to conduct the means inquiry required by the national legislation (Lloyd and Others v. the United Kingdom, § § 108 and 116), or the lower courts had failed properly to consider alternatives to imprisonment (ibid., § 113). On the other hand, where there was no evidence that the national courts' conduct amounted to a "gross or obvious irregularity", the Court held that the detention was lawful (ibid., § 114).
8) Reasoning of decisions and the requirement of non-arbitrariness
36. The absence or lack of reasoning in detention orders is one of the elements taken into account by the Court when assessing the lawfulness of detention under Article 5 § 1. Thus, the absence of any grounds given by the judicial authorities in their decisions authorising detention for a prolonged period of time may be incompatible with the principle of protection from arbitrariness enshrined in Article 5 § 1 (Stašaitis v. Lithuania, (66) (67) . Likewise, a decision which is extremely laconic and makes no reference to any legal provision which would permit detention will fail to provide sufficient protection from arbitrariness (Khudoyorov v. Russia, § 157) .
37. However, the Court may consider the applicant's detention to be in conformity with the domestic legislation despite the lack of reasons in the detention order where the national courts were satisfied that there had been some grounds for the applicant's detention on remand (Minjat v. Switzerland, § 43) . Furthermore, where the domestic courts had quashed the detention order for lack of reasons but considered that there had been some grounds for the applicant's detention, the refusal to order release of the detainee and remittal of the case to the lower courts for determination of the lawfulness of detention did not amount to a violation of Article 5 § 1 (ibid., § 47).
38. What is required is a detention order based on concrete grounds and setting a specific time-limit (Meloni v. Switzerland, § 53) . Moreover, authorities should consider less intrusive measures than detention (Ambruszkiewicz v. Poland, § 32) .
9) Some acceptable procedural flaws
39. The following procedural flaws have been found not to render the applicant's detention unlawful: -A failure to notify the detention order officially to the accused did not amount to a "gross or obvious irregularity" in the exceptional sense indicated by the case-law given that the authorities genuinely believed that the order had been notified to the applicant (Marturana v. Italy, § 79; but see Voskuil v. the Netherlands,  in which the Court found a violation where there had been a failure to notify a detention order within the time-limit prescribed by law: three days instead of twenty-four hours); -A mere clerical error in the arrest warrant or detention order which was later cured by a judicial authority (Nikolov v. Bulgaria, § 63; Douiyeb v. the Netherlands [GC] , § 52); -The replacement of the formal ground for an applicant's detention in view of the facts mentioned by the courts in support of their conclusions (Gaidjurgis v. Lithuania (dec.) ). A failure to give adequate reasons for such replacement however may lead the Court to conclude that there has been a breach of Article 5 § 1 (Calmanovici v. Romania, § 65) .
10) Delay in executing order of release
40. It is inconceivable that in a State subject to the rule of law a person should continue to be deprived of his liberty despite the existence of a court order for his release (Assanidze v. Georgia [GC] , § 173). The Court however recognises that some delay in carrying out a decision to release a detainee is understandable and often inevitable. Nevertheless, the national authorities must attempt to keep it to a minimum (Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, § 25) . A delay of eleven hours in executing a decision to release the applicant "forthwith" was found to be incompatible with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (ibid.; Quinn v. France, § § 39-43).
III. AUTHORISED DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY UNDER ARTICLE 5 § 1 A. Detention after conviction
Article 5 § 1 (a) "1. … No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;"
1) Existence of a conviction
41. Article 5 § 1 (a) applies to any "conviction" occasioning deprivation of liberty pronounced by a court and makes no distinction based on the legal character of the offence of which a person has been found guilty whether classified as criminal or disciplinary by the internal law of the State in question (Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, § 68; Galstyan v. Armenia, § 46) . 42. The term signifies both a finding of guilt, and the imposition of a penalty or other measure involving the deprivation of liberty (Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC] , § 125; James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom, § 189; M. v. Germany, § 87; Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, § 35; B. v. Austria, § 38) .
43. The provision does not prevent Contracting States from executing orders for detention imposed by competent courts outside their territory (X. v. Germany, Commission decision of 14 December 1963). Although Contracting States are not obliged to verify whether the proceedings resulting in the conviction were compatible with all the requirements of Article 6 (Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, § 110) , a conviction can not be the result of a flagrant denial of justice (Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], § 461; Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, § 51) . If a conviction is the result of proceeedings which were "manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 or the principles embodied therein", the resulting deprivation of liberty would not be justified under Article 5 § 1 (a) (Willcox and Hurford v. the United Kingdom (dec.), § 95).
2) Competent court
44. The term "court" denotes bodies which exhibit not only common fundamental features, of which the most important is independence of the executive and of the parties to the case, but also the guarantees of judicial procedure (Weeks v. the United Kingdom, § 61; De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, § 78) . The forms of the procedure need not, however, necessarily be identical in each of the cases where the intervention of a court is required. In order to determine whether a proceeding provides adequate guarantees, regard must be had to the particular nature of the circumstances in which such proceeding takes place (ibid.).
45. In addition, the body in question must not have merely advisory functions but must have the competence to decide the lawfulness of the detention and to order release if the detention is unlawful (X. v. the United Kingdom, § 61; Weeks v. the United Kingdom, § 61).
46. A court is not "competent" if its composition is not "established by law" (Yefimenko v. Russia, § § 109-11).
3) Detention must follow "after" conviction 47. The term "after" does not simply mean that the detention must follow the conviction in point of time: in addition, the detention must result from, follow and depend upon or occur by virtue of the conviction. In short, there must be a sufficient causal connection between the conviction and the deprivation of liberty at issue (James, Wells and Lee v. 48. However, with the passage of time, the causal link gradually becomes less strong and might eventually be broken if a position were reached in which a decision not to release and to re-detain (including the prolonging of preventive detention) were based on grounds unconnected to the objectives of the legislature or the court or on an assessment that was unreasonable in terms of those objectives. In those circumstances, a detention that was lawful at the outset would be transformed into a deprivation of liberty that was arbitrary and, hence, incompatible with Article 5 (ibid., § 124; and H. W. v. Germany, § 102; M. v. Germany, § 88 , for continued preventive detention).
49. The term "after conviction" cannot be interpreted as being restricted to the case of a final conviction, for this would exclude the arrest of convicted persons, who appeared for trial while still at liberty. It cannot be overlooked that the guilt of a person, detained during appeal or review proceedings, has been established in the course of a trial conducted in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 (Wemhoff v. Germany, § 9).
50. Article 5 § 1 (a) applies where persons of unsound mind are detained in psychiatric facilities after conviction (Radu v. Germany, § 97; X. v. the United Kingdom, § 39). However, it will not apply to such cases following an acquittal (Luberti v. Italy, § 25) .
4) Impact of appellate proceedings
51. A period of detention will, in principle, be lawful if it is carried out pursuant to a court order. A subsequent finding that the court erred under domestic law in making the order will not necessarily retrospectively affect the validity of the intervening period of detention. The Strasbourg organs have refused to uphold applications from persons convicted of criminal offences who complain that their convictions or sentences were found by domestic appellate courts to have been based on errors of fact or law (Benham v. the United Kingdom, § 42). However, detention following conviction is unlawful where it has no basis in domestic law or is arbitrary (Tsirlis and Kouloumpas v. Greece, § 62) .
B. Detention for non-compliance with a court order or legal obligation
Article 5 § 1 (b) "1. … No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: … (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;"
1) Non-compliance with the order of a court
52. The choice of the language in the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (b) presumes that the person arrested or detained must have had an opportunity to comply with a court order and has failed to do so (Beiere v. Latvia, § 49) .
53. Individuals cannot be held accountable for not complying with court orders if they have never been informed of them (ibid., § 50).
54. A refusal of a person to undergo certain measures or to follow a certain procedure prior to being ordered to do so by a competent court has no presumptive value in decisions concerning compliance with such a court order (Petukhova v. Russia, § 59) .
55. The domestic authorities must strike a fair balance between the importance in a democratic society of securing compliance with a lawful order of a court, and the importance of the right to liberty. Factors to be taken into consideration include the purpose of the order, the feasibility of compliance with the order, and the duration of the detention. The issue of proportionality assumes particular significance in the overall scheme of things (Gatt v. Malta, § 40) . (Gatt v. Malta) and a confinement in a psychiatric hospital (Beiere v. Latvia, where the detention decision was found not to be a "lawful order of a court").
2) Fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law
57. The second limb of Article 5 § 1 (b) allows for detention only to "secure the fulfilment" of any obligation prescribed by law. There must therefore be an unfulfilled obligation incumbent on the person concerned and the arrest and detention must be for the purpose of securing its fulfilment and not punitive in character. As soon as the relevant obligation has been fulfilled, the basis for detention under Article 5 § 1 (b) ceases to exist (Vasileva v. Denmark, § 36) .
58. The obligation must be of a specific and concrete nature (Ciulla v. Italy, § 36) . A wide interpretation would entail consequences incompatible with the notion of the rule of law (Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, § 69; Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria, § 72) .
59. The obligation not to commit a criminal offence can only be considered as "specific and concrete" if the place and time of the imminent commission of the offence and its potential victims have been sufficiently specified. In the context of a duty to refrain from doing something, as distinct from a duty to perform a specific act, it is necessary, prior to concluding that a person has failed to satisfy his obligation at issue, that the person concerned was made aware of the specific act which was to refrain from committing and that the person showed himself or herself not to be willing to refrain from so doing (Ostendorf v. Germany, (93) (94) .
60. An arrest will only be acceptable in Convention terms if "the obligation prescribed by law" cannot be fulfilled by milder means (Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, § 136) . The principle of proportionality further dictates that a balance must be struck between the importance in a democratic society of securing the immediate fulfilment of the obligation in question, and the importance of the right to liberty (Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 70).
61. In this assessment the Court considers the following points relevant: the nature of the obligation arising from the relevant legislation including its underlying object and purpose; the person being detained and the particular circumstances leading to the detention; and the length of the detention (Vasileva v. Denmark, § 38; Epple v. Germany, § 37) .
62. Situations examined under the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (b) include, for example, an obligation to submit to a security check when entering a country (McVeigh and Others v. the United Kingdom, Commission report), to disclose details of one's personal identity (Vasileva v. Denmark; Novotka v. Slovakia (dec.) ; Sarigiannis v. Italy) , to undergo a psychiatric examination (Nowicka v. Poland) , to leave a certain area (Epple v. Germany) , to appear for questioning at a police station (Iliya Stefanov v. Bulgaria; Osypenko v. Ukraine; and Khodorkovskiy v. Russia) and to keep the peace by not committing a criminal offence (Ostendorf v. Germany) .
C. Detention on remand
Article 5 § 1 (c) "1. … No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: … (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;"
1) Purpose of arrest or detention
63. "Effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority" qualifies all the three alternative bases for arrest or detention under Article 5 § 1 (c) (Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), § § 13-14; Ireland v. the United Kingdom, § 196) .
64. A person may be detained under Article 5 § 1 (c) only in the context of criminal proceedings, for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on suspicion of his having committed an offence (Ječius v. Lithuania, § 50; Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, § 72) .
65. The second alternative of that provision ("when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence") also governs only pre-trial detention and not custody for preventive purposes without the person concerned being suspected of having already committed a criminal offence (Ostendorf v. Germany, § 82) .
66. The existence of the purpose to bring a suspect before a court has to be considered independently of the achievement of that purpose. The standard imposed by Article 5 § 1 (c) does not presuppose that the police have sufficient evidence to bring charges at the time of arrest or while the applicant was in custody (Petkov and Profirov v. Bulgaria, § 52; Erdagöz v. Turkey, § 51 67. Detention pursuant to Article 5 § 1 (c) must be a proportionate measure to achieve the stated aim (Ladent v. Poland, (55) (56) .
68. The expression "competent legal authority" has the same meaning as "judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" in Article 5 § 3 (Schiesser v. Switzerland, § 29) .
2) Meaning of "reasonable suspicion"
69. A "reasonable suspicion" that a criminal offence has been committed presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed an offence (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, § 88; Erdagöz v. Turkey, § 51; Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, § 32). Therefore, a failure by the authorities to make a genuine inquiry into the basic facts of a case in order to verify whether a complaint was well-founded disclosed a violation of Article 5 § 1 (c) (Stepuleac v. Moldova, § 73; Elçi and Others v. Turkey, § 674) .
70. What may be regarded as "reasonable" will however depend upon all the circumstances of the cases (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, § 32) .
71. In the context of terrorism, though Contracting States cannot be required to establish the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest of a suspected terrorist by disclosing confidential sources of information, the Court has held that the exigencies of dealing with terrorist crime cannot justify stretching the notion of "reasonableness" to the point where the safeguard secured by Article 5 § 1 (c) is impaired (O'Hara v. the United Kingdom, § 35).
72. Uncorroborated hearsay evidence of an anonymous informant was held not to be sufficient to found "reasonable suspicion" of the applicant being involved in mafia-related activities (Labita v. Italy [GC] , § § 156 et seq.). By contrast, incriminating statements dating back to a number of years and later withdrawn by the suspects did not remove the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the applicant. Furthermore, it did not have an effect on the lawfulness of the arrest warrant (Talat Tepe v. Turkey, § 61).
3) The term "offence" 73. The term "offence" has an autonomous meaning, identical to that of "criminal offence" in Article 6. The classification of the offence under national law is one factor to be taken into account. However, the nature of the proceedings and the severity of the penalty at stake are also relevant (Benham v. the United Kingdom, § 56).
74. The "offence" must be specific and concrete: preventive detention of individuals viewed by the State as presenting a danger on account of their continuing propensity to crime is not allowed (Guzzardi v. Italy, § 102; Ciulla v. Italy, § 40; M. v. Germany, § 89; Shimovolos v. Russia, § 54) .
D. Detention of a minor
Article 5 § 1 (d) "1. … No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: … (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;" 76. Sub-paragraph d) is not only a provision which permits the detention of a minor. It contains a specific, but not exhaustive, example of circumstances in which minors might be detained, namely for the purpose of (a) their educational supervision or (b) bringing them before the competent legal authority (Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, § 100) .
1) General
2) Educational supervision
77. The first limb of Article 5 § 1 (d) authorises detention pursuant to a court or administrative order for the purposes of securing a child's attendance at an educational establishment.
78. In the context of the detention of minors, the words "educational supervision" must not be equated rigidly with notions of classroom teaching. Such supervision must embrace many aspects of the exercise, by the authority, of parental rights for the benefit and protection of the person concerned (P. and S. v. Poland, § 147; Ichin and Others v. Ukraine, § 39; D.G. v. Ireland, § 80) .
79. Sub-paragraph (d) does not preclude an interim custody measure being used as a preliminary to a regime of supervised education, without itself involving any supervised education. In such circumstances, however, the imprisonment must be speedily followed by actual application of such a regime in a setting (open or closed) designed and with sufficient resources for the purpose (Bouamar v. Belgium, § 50) .
80. If the State has chosen a system of educational supervision involving a deprivation of liberty, it is obliged to put in place appropriate institutional facilities which meet the security and educational demands of that system in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 5 § 1 d) (A. and Others v. Bulgaria, § 69; D.G. v. Ireland, § 79) .
81. The Court does not consider that a juvenile holding facility itself constitutes "educational supervision", if no educational activities are provided (Ichin and Others v. Ukraine, § 39) .
3) Competent legal authority
82. The second limb of Article 5 § 1 (d) governs the lawful detention of a minor for the purpose of bringing him or her before the competent legal authority. According to the travaux préparatoires, this provision was intended to cover detention of a minor prior to civil or administrative proceedings, while the detention in connection with criminal proceedings was intended to be covered by Article 5 § 1 (c).
83. However, the detention of a minor accused of a crime during the preparation of a psychiatric report necessary for the taking of a decision on his mental conditions has been considered to fall under sub-paragraph d), as being detention for the purpose of bringing a minor before the competent authority (X. v. Switzerland, Commission decision of 14 December 1979).
E. Detention for medical or social reasons
Article 5 § 1 (e) "1. … No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: … (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;"
1) General
84. Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention refers to several categories of individuals, namely persons spreading infectious diseases, persons of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug addicts and vagrants. There is a link between all those persons in that they may be deprived of their liberty either in order to be given medical treatment or because of considerations dictated by social policy, or on both medical and social grounds (Enhorn v. Sweden, § 43) .
85. The reason why the Convention allows these individuals, all of whom are socially maladjusted, to be deprived of their liberty is not only that they may be a danger to public safety but also that their own interests may necessitate their detention (ibidem; Guzzardi v. Italy, § 98 in fine).
2) Prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases
86. The essential criteria when assessing the "lawfulness" of the detention of a person "for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases" are: -whether the spreading of the infectious disease is dangerous to public health or safety; and -whether detention of the person infected is the last resort in order to prevent the spreading of the disease, because less severe measures have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the public interest.
When these criteria are no longer fulfilled, the basis for the deprivation of liberty ceases to exist (Enhorn v. Sweden, § 44) .
3) Detention of persons of unsound mind
87. The term "a person of unsound mind" does not lend itself to precise definition since psychiatry is an evolving field, both medically and in social attitudes. However, it cannot be taken to permit the detention of someone simply because his or her views or behaviour deviate from established norms (Rakevich v. Russia, § 26) .
88. An individual cannot be deprived of his liberty as being of "unsound mind" unless the following three minimum conditions are satisfied (Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], § 145; D.D. v. Lithuania, § 156; Kallweit v. Germany, § 45; Shtukaturov v. Russia, § 114; Varbanov v. Bulgaria, § 45; and Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, § 39) : -the individual must be reliably shown, by objective medical expertise, to be of unsound mind, unless emergency detention is required; -the individual's mental disorder must be of a kind to warrant compulsory confinement. The deprivation of liberty must be shown to have been necessary in the circumstances; -the mental disorder, verified by objective medical evidence, must persist throughout the period of detention.
89. No deprivation of liberty of a person considered to be of unsound mind may be deemed in conformity with Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention if it has been ordered without seeking the opinion of a medical expert (Ruiz Rivera v. Switzerland, § 59; S.R. v. the Netherlands (dec.) , § 31).
90. As to the second of the above conditions, the detention of a mentally disordered person may be necessary not only where the person needs therapy, medication or other clinical treatment to cure or alleviate his condition, but also where the person needs control and supervision to prevent him, for example, causing harm to himself or other persons (Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, § 52).
A mental condition must be of a certain gravity in order to be considered as a "true" mental disorder (Glien v. Germany, § 85) .
91. In deciding whether an individual should be detained as a person "of unsound mind", the national authorities are to be recognised as having a certain discretion since it is in the first place for the national authorities to evaluate the evidence adduced before them in a particular case (Plesó v. Hungary, § 61; H.L. v. the United Kingdom, § 98) .
92. The relevant time at which a person must be reliably established to be of unsound mind, for the requirements of sub-paragraph (e) of Article 5 § 1, is the date of the adoption of the measure depriving that person of his liberty as a result of that condition (O.H. v. Germany, § 78) .
93. When the medical evidence points to recovery, the authorities may need some time to consider whether to terminate an applicant's confinement (Luberti v. Italy, § 28) . However, the continuation of deprivation of liberty for purely administrative reasons is not justified § 129) .
94. The detention of persons of unsound mind must be effected in a hospital, clinic, or other appropriate institution authorised for the detention of such persons (L. B. v. Belgium, § 93; Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, § 44; O.H. v. Germany, § 79) .
95. By contrast, a person can be placed temporarily in an establishment not specifically designed for the detention of mental health patients before being transferred to the appropriate institution, provided that the waiting period is not excessively long (Pankiewicz v. Poland, (44) (45) Morsink v. the Netherlands, (67) (68) (69) Brand v. the Netherlands, (64) (65) (66) .
4) Detention of alcoholics and drug addicts
96. Article 5 § 1 (e) of the Convention should not be interpreted as only allowing the detention of "alcoholics" in the limited sense of persons in a clinical state of "alcoholism", because nothing in the text of this provision prevents that measure from being applied by the State to an individual abusing alcohol, in order to limit the harm caused by alcohol to himself and the public, or to prevent dangerous behaviour after drinking (Kharin v. Russia, § 34) .
97. Therefore, persons who are not medically diagnosed as "alcoholics", but whose conduct and behaviour under the influence of alcohol pose a threat to public order or themselves, can be taken into custody for the protection of the public or their own interests, such as their health or personal safety (Hilda Hafsteinsdóttir v. Iceland, § 42) . That does not mean however that Article 5 § 1 (e) permits the detention of an individual merely because of his alcohol intake (Witold Litwa v. Poland, § § 61-62).
5) Vagrants
98. The case-law on "vagrants" is scarce. The scope of the provision encompasses persons who have no fixed abode, no means of subsistence and no regular trade or profession. These three conditions, inspired by the Belgian Criminal Code, are cumulative: they must be fulfilled at the same time with regard to the same person (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, § 68) .
F. Detention of a foreigner
Article 5 § 1 (f) "1. … No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: … (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition."
1) Detention to prevent unauthorised entry into country
99. Article 5 § 1 (f) allows States to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context. While the first limb of that provision permits the detention of an asylum seeker or other immigrant prior to the State's grant of authorisation to enter, such detention must be compatible with the overall purpose of Article 5, which is to safeguard the right to liberty and ensure that no-one should be dispossessed of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion (Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], § § 64-66).
100. The question as to when the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) ceases to apply, because the individual has been granted formal authorisation to enter or stay, is largely dependent on national law (Suso Musa v. Malta, § 97).
101. The principle that detention should not be arbitrary applies to the detention under the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) in the same manner as it applies to detention under the second limb (Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 73).
102. "Freedom from arbitrariness" in the context of the first limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) therefore means that such detention must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that the measure is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued (ibidem, § 74).
103. When reviewing the manner in which the detention order was implemented the Court must have regard to the particular situation of would-be immigrants (Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, § 80 , where the applicant and her three children were kept in a closed facility designed for adults; Rahimi v. Greece, § 108, concerning the automatic application of detention to an unaccompanied minor).
2) Detention with a view to deportation or extradition
104. Article 5 § 1 (f) does not demand that detention be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent the individual from committing an offence or fleeing. In this respect, Article 5 § 1 (f) provides a different level of protection from Article 5 § 1 (c): all that is required under sub-paragraph (f) is that "action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition". It is therefore immaterial, for the purposes of its application, whether the underlying decision to expel can be justified under national or Convention law (Chahal v 105. Detention may be justified for the purposes of the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) by enquiries from the competent authorities, even if a formal request or an order of extradition has not been issued, given that such enquires may be considered "actions" taken in the sense of the provision (X. v. Switzerland, Commission decision of 9 December 1980).
106. Any deprivation of liberty under the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) will be justified only for as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 § 1 (f) (A. 107. To avoid being branded as arbitrary, detention under Article 5 § 1 (f) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate; and the length of the detention should not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued (ibidem; see also Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, § § 117-19 with further references).
108. Detention with a view to expulsion should not be punitive in nature and should be accompanied by appropriate safeguards (Azimov v. Russia, § 172).
109. Article 5 § 1 (f) or other sub-paragraphs do not permit a balance to be struck between the individual's right to liberty and the State's interest in protecting its population from terrorist threat (A. and Others v. 
the United Kingdom [GC], § 171).
110. The Convention contains no provisions concerning the circumstances in which extradition may be granted, or the procedure to be followed before extradition may be granted. Subject to it being the result of cooperation between the States concerned and provided that the legal basis for the order for the fugitive's arrest is an arrest warrant issued by the authorities of the fugitive's State of origin, even an atypical extradition cannot as such be regarded as being contrary to the Convention (Öcalan v. Turkey [GC] , § 86; Adamov v. Switzerland, § 57).
111. As regards extradition arrangements between States when one is a party to the Convention and the other is not, the rules established by an extradition treaty or, in the absence of any such treaty, the cooperation between the States concerned are also relevant factors to be taken into account for determining whether the arrest that has led to the subsequent complaint to the Court was lawful. The fact that a fugitive has been handed over as a result of cooperation between States does not in itself make the arrest unlawful and does not therefore give rise to any problem under Article 5 (Öcalan v. Turkey [GC] , § 87).
112. The implementation of an interim measure following an indication by the Court to a State Party that it would be desirable not to return an individual to a particular country does not in itself have any bearing on whether the deprivation of liberty to which that individual may be subject complies with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien] v. France, § 74) . Detention should still be lawful and not arbitrary (Azimov v. Russia, § 169) .
The fact that the application of such a measure prevents the individual's deportation does not render his detention unlawful, provided that the expulsion proceedings are still pending and the duration of his continued detention is not unreasonable (S.P. v. Belgium (dec.), and Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, § 120).
IV. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY
A. Information on the reasons for arrest (Article 5 § 2)
Article 5 § 2 "2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him."
1) Applicability
113. The words used in Article 5 § 2 should be interpreted autonomously and, in particular, in accordance with the aim and purpose of Article 5 which is to protect everyone from arbitrary deprivations of liberty. The term "arrest" extends beyond the realm of criminal law measures and the words "any charge" do not indicate a condition of applicability but an eventuality which is taken into account. Article 5 § 4 does not make any distinction between persons deprived of their liberty on the basis of whether they have been arrested or detained. Therefore, there are no grounds for excluding the latter from the scope of Article 5 § 2 (Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, § § 27-28) which extends to detention for the purposes of extradition (Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, and medical treatment (Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, § § 27-28; X. v. the United Kingdom, § 66) and also applies where persons have been recalled to places of detention following a period of conditional release (; X v. Belgium, Commission decision).
2) Purpose
114. Article 5 § 2 contains the elementary safeguard that any person arrested should know why he is being deprived of his liberty and is an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded by Article 5. Where a person has been informed of the reasons for his arrest or detention, he may, if he sees fit, apply to a court to challenge the lawfulness of his detention in accordance with Article 5 § 4 (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, § 40; Čonka v. Belgium, § 50).
115. Any person who is entitled to take proceedings to have the lawfulness of his detention decided speedily cannot make effective use of that right unless he is promptly and adequately informed of the reasons why he has been deprived of his liberty (Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, § 28; Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, § 413) .
3) Person to whom the reasons must be provided
It is plain from the wording of Article 5 § 2 that the duty on States is to furnish specific information to the individual or his representative (Saadi v. the United Kingdom, § 53, confirmed by the Grand Chamber in 2008)
. If the applicant is incapable of receiving the information, the relevant details must be given to those persons who represent his interests such as a lawyer or guardian (X. v. the United Kingdom, Commission Report, § 106; Z.H. v. Hungary, § § 42-43).
4) Reasons must be provided "promptly"
117. Whether the promptness of the information conveyed is sufficient must be assessed in each case according to its special features. However, the reasons need not be related in their entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the 
5) Manner in which the reasons are provided
119. The reasons do not have to be set out in the text of any decision authorising detention and do not have to be in writing or in any special form (X. v. Germany, Commission decision of 13 December 1978; Kane v. Cyprus (dec.) ).
However, if the condition of a person with intellectual disability is not given due consideration in this process, it cannot be said that he was provided with the requisite information enabling him to make effective and intelligent use of the right ensured by Article 5 § 4 to challenge the lawfulness of detention unless a lawyer or another authorised person was informed in his stead (Z.H. v. Hungary, § 41) .
120. The reasons for the arrest may be provided or become apparent in the course of postarrest interrogations or questioning (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the 121. Arrested persons may not claim a failure to understand the reasons for their arrest in circumstances where they were arrested immediately after the commission of a criminal and intentional act (Dikme v. Turkey, § 54) or where they were aware of the details of alleged offences contained within previous arrest warrants and extradition requests (Öcalan v. Turkey (dec)).
6) Extent of the reasons required
122. Whether the content of the information conveyed is sufficient must be assessed in each case according to its special features (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. 123. Arrested persons must be told, in simple, non-technical language that they can understand, the essential legal and factual grounds for the arrest, so as to be able, if they see fit, to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with Article 5 § 4 (Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, § 40; Murray v. the United Kingdom [GC] , § 72). However, Article 5 § 2 does not require that the information consist of a complete list of the charges held against the arrested person ( Bordovskiy v. Russia, § 56; Nowak v. Ukraine, § 63; Gasiņš v. Latvia, § 53) .
124. Where persons are arrested for the purposes of extradition, the information given may be even less complete (Suso Musa v. Malta, § § 113 and 116; Kaboulov v. Ukraine, § 144; Bordovskiy v. Russia, § 56) as arrest for such purposes does not require a decision on the merits of any charge (Bejaoui v. Greece, Commission decision). However, such persons must nonetheless receive sufficient information so as to be able to apply to a court for the review of lawfulness provided for in Article 5 § 4 (Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, § 427) .
7) In a language which he understands
125. Where the warrant of arrest, if any, is written in a language which the arrested person does not understand, Article 5 § 2 will be complied with where the applicant is subsequently interrogated, and thus made aware of the reasons for his arrest, in a language which he understands (Delcourt v. Belgium, Commission decision).
126. However, where translators are used for this purpose, it is incumbent on the authorities to ensure that requests for translation are formulated with meticulousness and precision (Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, § 425) . Judicial control is implied by the rule of law, "one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society …, which is expressly referred to in the Preamble to the Convention" and "from which the whole Convention draws its inspiration" (Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 58).
129. Judicial control serves to provide effective safeguards against the risk of illtreatment, which is at its greatest in this early stage of detention, and against the abuse of powers bestowed on law enforcement officers or other authorities for what should be narrowly restricted purposes and exercisable strictly in accordance with prescribed procedures (Ladent v. Poland, § 72) .
2) Prompt and automatic judicial control
130. The opening part of Article 5 § 3 is aimed at ensuring prompt and automatic judicial control of police or administrative detention ordered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) (De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, § 51; Aquilina v. Malta [GC] , § § 48-49).
131. Judicial control on the first appearance of an arrested individual must above all be prompt, to allow detection of any ill-treatment and to keep to a minimum any unjustified interference with individual liberty. The strict time constraint imposed by this requirement leaves little flexibility in interpretation, otherwise there would be a serious weakening of a procedural guarantee to the detriment of the individual and the risk of impairing the very essence of the right protected by this provision (McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC] , § 33).
132. Article 5 § 3 does not provide for any possible exceptions from the requirement that a person be brought promptly before a judge or other judicial officer after his or her arrest or detention, not even on grounds of prior judicial involvement (Bergmann v. Estonia, § 45 Silivestru v. Romania, § 32) . Shorter periods can also breach the promptness requirement if there are no special difficulties or exceptional circumstances preventing the authorities from bringing the arrested person before a judge sooner (Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, İpek and Others v. Turkey, (36) (37) and Kandzhov v. Bulgaria, § 66) .
The requirement of promptness is even stricter in a situation where the placement in police custody follows on from a period of actual deprivation of liberty (Vassis and Others v. France, § 60 , concerning the detention of a crew on the high seas).
134. The fact that an arrested person had access to a judicial authority is not sufficient to constitute compliance with the opening part of 3) The nature of the appropriate judicial officer 137. The expression "judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" is a synonym for "competent legal authority" in Article 5 § 1 (c) (Schiesser v. Switzerland, § 29) .
138. The exercise of "judicial power" is not necessarily confined to adjudicating on legal disputes. Article 5 § 3 includes officials in public prosecutors' departments as well as judges sitting in court (ibidem, § 28).
139. The "officer" referred to in paragraph 3 must offer guarantees befitting the "judicial" power conferred on him by law (ibidem, § 30).
140. Formal, visible requirements stated in the "law" as opposed to standard practices are especially important for the identification of the judicial authority empowered to decide on the liberty of an individual (Hood v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 60; De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, § 48) .
141. The "officer" is not identical with the "judge" but must nevertheless have some of the latter's attributes, that is to say he must satisfy certain conditions each of which constitutes a guarantee for the person arrested (Schiesser v. Switzerland, § 31) .
4) Independence
142. The first of such conditions is independence of the executive and of the parties. This does not mean that the "officer" may not be to some extent subordinate to other judges or officers provided that they themselves enjoy similar independence (ibid.).
143. A judicial officer who is competent to decide on detention may also carry out other duties, but there is a risk that his impartiality may arouse legitimate doubt on the part of those subject to his decisions if he is entitled to intervene in the subsequent proceedings as a representative of the prosecuting authority (Huber v. Switzerland, § 43; Brincat v. Italy, § 20) .
144. In this respect, objective appearances at the time of the decision on detention are material: if it then appears that the "officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" may later intervene in subsequent criminal proceedings on behalf of the prosecuting authority, his independence and impartiality may be open to doubt (ibid. 149. The matters which the judicial officer must examine go beyond the question of lawfulness. The review required under Article 5 § 3, being intended to establish whether the deprivation of the individual's liberty is justified, must be sufficiently wide to encompass the various circumstances militating for or against detention (Aquilina v. Malta [GC], § 52).
150. The examination of lawfulness may be more limited in scope in the particular circumstances of a given case than under Article 5 § 4 ( Stephens v. Malta (no. 2) , § 58). 152. It is highly desirable in order to minimise delay, that the judicial officer who conducts the first automatic review of lawfulness and the existence of a ground for detention, also has the competence to consider release on bail. It is not however a requirement of the Convention and there is no reason in principle why the issues cannot be dealt with by two judicial officers, within the requisite time frame. In any event, as a matter of interpretation, it cannot be required that the examination of bail take place with any more speed than is demanded of the first automatic review, which the Court has identified as being a maximum four days (ibidem, § 47).
C. Right to trial within a reasonable time or to be released pending trial (Article 5 § 3)
Article 5 § 3 "3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article … shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial."
1) Period to be taken into consideration
153. In determining the length of detention pending trial under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins on the day the accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance (see, for example, Solmaz v. Turkey, [23] [24] Kalashnikov v. Russia, § 110; Wemhoff v. Germany, § 9) .
154. In view of the essential link between Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and paragraph 1 (c) of that Article, a person convicted at first instance cannot be regarded as being detained "for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence", as specified in the latter provision, but is in the position provided for by Article 5 § 1 (a), which authorises deprivation of liberty "after conviction by a competent court" (see, among numerous authorities, Belevitskiy v. Russia, § 99; Piotr Baranowski v. Poland, § 45; Górski v. Poland, § 41) .
2) General principles
155. The second limb of Article 5 § 3 does not give judicial authorities a choice between either bringing an accused to trial within a reasonable time or granting him provisional release pending trial. Until conviction, he must be presumed innocent, and the purpose of the provision under consideration is essentially to require his provisional release once his continuing detention ceases to be reasonable.
156. Continued detention therefore can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the Convention.
157. The responsibility falls in the first place to the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must, paying due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of the above-mentioned demand of public interest justifying a departure from the rule in Article 5 and must set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in these decisions and of the established facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3.
158. The persistence of reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, but with the lapse of time this no longer suffices and the Court must then establish whether the other grounds given by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds were "relevant" and "sufficient", the Court must also be satisfied that the national authorities displayed "special diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings.
159. In sum, domestic courts are under an obligation to review the continued detention of persons pending trial with a view to ensuring release when circumstances no longer justify continued deprivation of liberty. For at least an initial period, the existence of reasonable suspicion may justify detention but there comes a moment when this is no longer enough. As the question whether or not a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract but must be assessed in each case according to its special features, there is no 160. The arguments for and against release must not be "general and abstract" (Boicenco v. Moldova, § 142; Khudoyorov v. Russia, § 173) , but contain references to the specific facts and the applicant's personal circumstances justifying his detention (Aleksanyan v. Russia, § 179).
161. Quasi-automatic prolongation of detention contravenes the guarantees set forth in Article 5 § 3 (Tase v. Romania, § 40).
162. The burden of proof in these matters should not be reversed by making it incumbent on the detained person to demonstrate the existence of reasons warranting his release (Bykov v. Russia [GC] , § 64).
163. Where circumstances that could have warranted a person's detention may have existed but were not mentioned in the domestic decisions it is not the Court's task to establish them and to take the place of the national authorities which ruled on the applicant's detention (ibid., § 66; Giorgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, § 77) . It is only by giving a reasoned decision that there can be public scrutiny of the administration of justice (Tase v. Romania, § 41) .
3) Grounds for continued detention
164. The Convention case-law has developed four basic acceptable reasons for refusing bail: (a) the risk that the accused will fail to appear for trial; (b) the risk that the accused, if released, would take action to prejudice the administration of justice, or (c) commit further offences, or (d) cause public disorder (Tiron v. Romania, § 37; Smirnova v. Russia, § 59; Piruzyan v. Armenia, § 94) . 165. The danger of absconding cannot be gauged solely on the basis of the severity of the sentence risked. It must be assessed with reference to a number of other relevant factors which may either confirm the existence of a danger of absconding or make it appear so slight that it cannot justify pre-trial detention (Panchenko v. Russia, § 106) .
166. The risk of absconding has to be assessed in light of the factors relating to the person's character, his morals, home, occupation, assets, family ties and all kinds of links with the country in which he is being prosecuted (Becciev v. Moldova, § 58) .
167. The mere absence of a fixed residence does not give rise to a danger of flight (Sulaoja v. Estonia, § 64) .
168. The danger of flight necessarily decreases with the passages of time spent in detention (Neumeister v. Austria, § 10) .
169. While the severity of the sentence faced is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk that an accused might abscond, the gravity of the charges cannot by itself serve to justify long periods of detention on remand (Idalov v. Russia [GC], § 145; Garycki v. Poland, § 47; Chraidi v. Germany, § 40; Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, (80) (81) .
170. Although, in general, the expression "the state of evidence" may be a relevant factor for the existence and persistence of serious indications of guilt, it alone cannot justify lengthy detention (Dereci v. Turkey, § 38) .
(b) Obstruction of the proceedings 171. The danger of the accused's hindering the proper conduct of the proceedings cannot be relied upon in abstracto, it has to be supported by factual evidence (Becciev v. Moldova, § 59) .
172. The risk of pressure being brought to bear on witnesses can be accepted at the initial stages of the proceedings (Jarzynski v. Poland, § 43) .
173. In the long term, however, the requirements of the investigation do not suffice to justify the detention of a suspect: in the normal course of events the risks alleged diminish with the passing of time as the inquiries are effected, statements taken and verifications carried out (Clooth v. Belgium, § 44) .
(c) Repetition of offences
174. The seriousness of a charge may lead the judicial authorities to place and leave a suspect in detention on remand in order to prevent any attempts to commit further offences. It is however necessary that the danger be a plausible one and the measure appropriate, in the light of the circumstances of the case and in particular the past history and the personality of the person concerned (ibid., § 40).
175. Previous convictions could give a ground for a reasonable fear that the accused might commit a new offence (Selçuk v. Turkey, § 34; Matznetter v. Austria, § 9) .
176. It cannot be concluded from the lack of a job or a family that a person is inclined to commit new offences (Sulaoja v. Estonia, § 64) .
(d) Preservation of public order
177. It is accepted that, by reason of their particular gravity and public reaction to them, certain offences may give rise to a social disturbance capable of justifying pre-trial detention, at least for a time. In exceptional circumstances this factor may therefore be taken into account for the purposes of the Convention, in any event in so far as domestic law recognises the notion of disturbance to public order caused by an offence.
178. However, this ground can be regarded as relevant and sufficient only provided that it is based on facts capable of showing that the accused's release would actually disturb public order. In addition, detention will continue to be legitimate only if public order remains actually threatened; its continuation cannot be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (Letellier v. France, § 51; I.A. v. France, § 104; Prencipe v. Monaco, § 79; Tiron v. Romania, (41) (42) .
4) Special diligence
179. The complexity and special characteristics of the investigation are factors to be considered in ascertaining whether the authorities displayed "special diligence" in the proceedings (Scott v. Spain, § 74) .
180. The right of an accused in detention to have his case examined with particular expedition must not unduly hinder the efforts of the judicial authorities to carry out their tasks with proper care (Shabani v. Switzerland, § 65; Sadegül Özdemir v. Turkey, § 44) .
5) Alternative measures
181. When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (Idalov v. Russia [GC] , § 140). That provision proclaims not only the right to "trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial" but also lays down that "release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial" (Khudoyorov v. Russia, § 183; Lelièvre v. Belgium, § 97; Shabani v. Switzerland, § 62) .
6) Bail
182. The guarantee provided for by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention is designed to ensure not the reparation of loss but, in particular, the appearance of the accused at the hearing. Its amount must therefore be assessed principally "by reference to [the accused], his assets and his relationship with the persons who are to provide the security, in other words to the degree of confidence that is possible that the prospect of loss of the security or of action against the guarantors in case of his non-appearance at the trial will act as a sufficient deterrent to dispel any wish on his part to abscond" (Mangouras v. Spain [GC], § 78; Neumeister v. Austria, § 14) .
183. Bail may only be required as long as reasons justifying detention prevail (Muşuc v. Moldova, § 42; Aleksandr Makarov v. Russia, § 139) . If the risk of absconding can be avoided by bail or other guarantees, the accused must be released, bearing in mind that where a lighter sentence could be anticipated, the reduced incentive for the accused to abscond should be taken into account (Vrenčev v. Serbia, § 76) . The authorities must take as much care in fixing appropriate bail as in deciding whether or not the accused's continued detention is indispensable (see, among other authorities, Piotr Osuch v. Poland, § 39; Bojilov v. Bulgaria, § 60; Skrobol v. Poland, § 57) .
184. Furthermore, the amount set for bail must be duly justified in the decision fixing bail (Georgieva v. Bulgaria, (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) and must take into account the accused's means (Hristova v. Bulgaria, § 111) and his capacity to pay (Toshev v. Bulgaria, (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) . In certain circumstances it may not be unreasonable to take into account also the amount of the loss imputed to him (Mangouras v. Spain [GC] , § § 81 and 92).
185. Automatic refusal of bail by virtue of the law, devoid of any judicial control, is incompatible with the guarantees of Article 5 § 3 (Piruzyan v. Armenia, §105; S.B.C. v. the United Kingdom, (23) (24) .
7) Justification for any period of detention
186. Article 5 § 3 of the Convention cannot be seen as authorising pre-trial detention unconditionally provided that it lasts no longer than a certain minimum period. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities (Idalov v. Russia [GC], § 140; Tase v. Romania, § 40; Castravet v. Moldova, § 33; Belchev v. Bulgaria, § 82) .
8) Pre-trial detention of minors
187. The pre-trial detention of minors should be used only as a measure of last resort; it should be as short as possible and, where detention is strictly necessary, minors should be kept apart from adults (Nart v. Turkey, § 31; Güveç v. Turkey, § 109 The notion of "lawfulness" under Article 5 § 4 has the same meaning as in Article 5 § 1, so that the arrested or detained person is entitled to a review of the "lawfulness" of his detention in the light not only of the requirements of domestic law but also of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 § 1 (Suso Musa v. Malta, § 50).
191. The forms of judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 may vary from one domain to another, and will depend on the type of deprivation of liberty in issue (M.H. v. the United Kingdom, § 75).
192. It is not excluded that a system of automatic periodic review of the lawfulness of detention by a court may ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 5 § 4. However, where automatic review has been instituted, the decisions on the lawfulness of detention must follow at "reasonable intervals" (Abdulkhanov v. Russia, , for a summary of the case-law in the context of detention under sub-paragprahs (a), (c), (e) and (f) of Article 5 § 1).
193. If a person is detained under Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, the "court" must be empowered to examine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he or she has committed an offence, because the existence of such a suspicion is essential if detention on remand is to be "lawful" under the Convention (Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC] , § 58).
194. Where a person is deprived of his liberty pursuant to a conviction by a competent court, the supervision required by Article 5 § 4 is incorporated in the decision by the court at the close of judicial proceedings (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, § 76) and no further review is therefore required. However, in cases where the grounds justifying the person's deprivation of liberty are susceptible to change with the passage of time, the possibility of recourse to a body satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention is required (Kafkaris v. Cyprus (dec.), § 58).
195. By virtue of Article 5 § 4, a detainee is entitled to apply to a "court" having jurisdiction to decide "speedily" whether or not his deprivation of liberty has become "unlawful" in the light of new factors which have emerged subsequently to the initial decision depriving a person of his liberty (Abdulkhanov v. Russia, § 208; Azimov v. Russia, .
196. A person of unsound mind who is compulsorily confined in a psychiatric institution for a lengthy period is entitled to take proceedings "at reasonable intervals" to put in issue the lawfulness of his detention (M.H. v. the United Kingdom, § 77, for a recent summary of the applicable principles). A system of periodic review in which the initiative lies solely with the authorities is not sufficient on its own (X. v. Finland, § 170; Raudevs v. Latvia, § 82) .
197. The criteria for "lawful detention" under Article 5 § 1 (e) entail that the review of lawfulness guaranteed by Article 5 § 4 in relation to the continuing detention of a mental health patient should be made by reference to the patient's contemporaneous state of health, including his or her dangerousness, as evidenced by up-to-date medical assessments, and not by reference to past events at the origin of the initial decision to detain (Juncal v. the United Kingdom (dec.), § 30; Ruiz Rivera v. Switzerland, § 60; H.W. v. Germany, § 107) .
198. The "court" to which the detained person has access for the purposes of Article 5 § 4 does not have to be a court of law of the classical kind integrated within the standard judicial machinery of the country (Weeks v. the United Kingdom, § 61). It must however be a body of "judicial character" offering certain procedural guarantees. Thus the "court" must be independent both of the executive and of the parties to the case (Stephens v. Malta (no. 1) , § 95).
199. To satisfy the requirements of the Convention the review of the national court should comply with both the substantial and procedural rules of the national legislation and be conducted in conformity with the aim of Article 5, the protection of the individual against arbitrariness (Koendjbiharie v. the Netherlands, § 27) .
200. Although Article 5 § 4 does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention, a State which institutes such a system must in principle accord to the detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance (Kučera v. Slovakia, § 107; Navarra v. France, § 28; Toth v. Austria, § 84) .
201. Article 5 § 4 does not impose an obligation on a court examining an appeal against detention to address every argument contained in the appellant's submissions. However, the court cannot treat as irrelevant, or disregard, concrete facts invoked by the detainee and capable of putting into doubt the existence of the conditions essential for the "lawfulness", in the sense of the Convention, of the deprivation of liberty (Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, § 94) .
202. The "court" must have the power to order release if it finds that the detention is unlawful; a mere power of recommendation is insufficient (Benjamin and Wilson v. the United Kingdom, (33) (34) .
3) Procedural guarantees
203. The requirement of procedural fairness under Article 5 § 4 does not impose a uniform, unvarying standard to be applied irrespective of the context, facts and circumstances. Although it is not always necessary that an Article 5 § 4 procedure be attended by the same guarantees as those required under Article 6 for criminal or civil litigation, it must have a judicial character and provide guarantees appropriate to the type of deprivation of liberty in question (A. and Others v. the 204. In the case of a person whose detention falls within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c), a hearing is required (Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC] , § 58). The opportunity for a detainee to be heard either in person or through some form of representation features among the fundamental guarantees of procedure applied in matters of deprivation of liberty (Kampanis v. Greece, § 47) .
However, Article 5 § 4 does not require that a detained person be heard every time he lodges an appeal against a decision extending his detention, but that it should be possible to exercise the right to be heard at reasonable intervals (Çatal v. Turkey, § 33; Altınok v. Turkey, § 45) .
205. The proceedings must be adversarial and must always ensure "equality of arms" between the parties (Reinprecht v. Austria, § 31; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC] , § 204). In remand cases, since the persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the accused person has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for the lawfulness of the continued detention, the detainee must be given an opportunity effectively to challenge the basis of the allegations against him. This may require the court to hear witnesses whose testimony appears to have a bearing on the continuing lawfulness of the detention (Ţurcan v. Moldova, (67) (68) (69) (70) .
Equality of arms is not ensured if the applicant, or his counsel, is denied access to those documents in the investigation file which are essential in order effectively to challenge the lawfulness of his detention (Ovsjannikov v. Estonia, § 72; Fodale v. Italy, § 41; Korneykova v. Ukraine, § 68) . It may also be essential that the individual concerned should not only have the opportunity to be heard in person but that he should also have the effective assistance of his lawyer (Cernák v. Slovakia, § 78) .
206. The principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms must equally be respected in the proceedings before the appeal court (Çatal v. Turkey, (33) (34) and the cases referred to therein).
4) The "speediness" requirement
207. Article 5 § 4, in guaranteeing to detained persons a right to institute proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of detention and the ordering of its termination if it proves unlawful (Idalov v. Russia [GC] , § 154; Baranowski v. Poland, § 68) . The question whether the right to a speedy decision has been respected must be determined in the light of the circumstances of each case (Rehbock v. Slovenia, § 84) .
208. The opportunity for legal review must be provided soon after the person is taken into detention and thereafter at reasonable intervals if necessary (Molotchko v. Ukraine, § 148) .
209. The notion of "speedily" (à bref délai) indicates a lesser urgency than that of "promptly" (aussitôt) in Article 5 § 3 (E. v. Norway, § 64; Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 59) .
However, where a decision to detain a person has been taken by a non-judicial authority rather than a court, the standard of "speediness" of judicial review under Article 5 § 4 comes closer to the standard of "promptness" under Article 5 § 3 (Shcherbina v. Russia, (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70)  where a delay of sixteen days in the judicial review of the applicant's detention order issued by the prosecutor was found to be excessive).
210. The standard of "speediness" is less stringent when it comes to proceedings before a court of appeal (Abdulkhanov v. Russia, § 198) . Where the original detention order was imposed by a court in a procedure offering appropriate guarantees of due process, the Court is prepared to tolerate longer periods of review in the proceedings before the second instance court (Shcherbina v. Russia, § 65) .
(a) The period to be taken into consideration 211. The Court has taken as a starting point the moment that the application for release was made/proceedings were instituted. The relevant period comes to an end with the final determination of the legality of the applicant's detention, including any appeal (SanchezReisse v. Switzerland, § 54; E. v. Norway, § 64) .
212. If an administrative remedy has to be exhausted before recourse can be had to a court, time begins to run when the administrative authority is seised of the matter (SanchezReisse v. Switzerland, § 54) .
213. If the proceedings have been conducted over two levels of jurisdiction, an overall assessment must be made in order to determine whether the requirement of "speedily" has been complied with (Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, § 78; Navarra v. France, § 28) .
(b) Relevant factors to be taken into consideration when assessing speediness 214. The term "speedily" cannot be defined in the abstract. As with the "reasonable time" stipulations in Article 5 § 3 and Article 6 § 1 it must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the individual case (R.M.D. v. Switzerland, § 42) .
215. In assessing the speedy character required by Article 5 § 4, comparable factors may be taken into consideration as those which play a role with respect to the requirement of trial within a reasonable time under Article 5 § 3 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention such as, the diligence shown by the authorities, any delay caused by the detained person and any other factors causing delay that do not engage the state's responsibility (Mooren v. Germany [GC] , § 106; Kolompar v. Belgium, § 42) .
216. Where one year per instance may be a rough rule of thumb in Article 6 § 1 cases, Article 5 § 4, concerning issues of liberty, requires particular expedition (Panchenko v. Russia, § 117) . Where an individual's personal liberty is at stake, the Court has very strict standards concerning the State's compliance with the requirement of speedy review of the lawfulness of detention (see, for example, Kadem v. Malta, [44] [45] , where the Court considered a time-period of seventeen days in deciding on the lawfulness of the applicant's detention to be excessive, and Mamedova v. Russia, § 96 , where the length of appeal proceedings lasting, inter alia, twenty-six days, was found to be in breach of the "speediness" requirement).
217. Where the determination involves complex issues -such as the detained person's medical condition -this may be taken into account when considering how long is "reasonable" under Article 5 § 4. However, even in complex cases, there are factors which require the authorities to carry out a particularly speedy review, including the presumption of innocence in the case of pre-trial detention (Frasik v. Poland, § 63; Jablonski v. Poland, (91) (92) (93) .
218. Detention on remand in criminal cases calls for short intervals between reviews ( Bezicheri v. Italy, § 21) .
219. If the length of time before a decision is taken is prima facie incompatible with the notion of speediness, the Court will look to the State to explain the reason for the delay or to put forward exceptional grounds to justify the lapse of time in question (Musiał v. Poland [GC] , § 44; Koendjbiharie v. the Netherlands, § 29) .
220. Neither an excessive workload nor a vacation period can justify a period of inactivity on the part of the judicial authorities (E. v. Norway, § 66; Bezicheri v. Italy, § 25) . 
3) Availability of compensation
225. Article 5 § 5 is complied with where it is possible to apply for compensation in respect of a deprivation of liberty effected in conditions contrary to paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 (see, as more recent authorities, Michalák v. Slovakia, § 204; Lobanov v. Russia, § 54) .
226. An enforceable right to compensation must be available either before or after the Court's judgment (Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC] , § § 183-84; Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom, § 67).
227. The effective enjoyment of the right to compensation must be ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty (see, for example, Ciulla v. Italy, § 44; Sakık and Others v. Turkey, § 60) . Compensation must be available both in theory (Dubovik v. Ukraine, § 74) and practice (Chitayev and Chitayev v. Russia, § 195) .
228. In considering compensation claims, the domestic authorities are required to interpret and apply domestic law in the spirit of Article 5, without excessive formalism (Shulgin v. Ukraine, § 65; Houtman and Meeus v. Belgium, § 46) .
4) Nature of compensation
229. The right to compensation relates primarily to financial compensation. It does not confer a right to secure the detained person's release, which is covered by Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (Bozano v. France, Commission decision).
230. Crediting a period of pre-trial detention towards a penalty does not amount to compensation required by Article 5 § 5, because of its non-financial character (Włoch v. Poland (no. 2) , § 32).
5) Existence of damage
231. Article 5 § 5 does not prohibit the Contracting States from making the award of compensation dependent upon the ability of the person concerned to show damage resulting from the breach. There can be no question of "compensation" where there is no pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage to compensate (Wassink v. the Netherlands, § 38) .
232. However, excessive formalism in requiring proof of non-pecuniary damage resulting from unlawful detention is not compliant with the right to compensation (Danev v. Bulgaria, (34) (35) . 235. An award cannot be considerably lower than that awarded by the Court in similar cases (Ganea v. Moldova, § 30; Cristina Boicenco v. Moldova, § 43) .
